← Back to the Game ShelfThe Stoic Opposition
THE
STOIC
OPPOSITION

LOAD IT UP

You are the private-equity firm. The debt is not yours. That is the point.
The deal. Your fund has just bought PlayMart Toys & Hobbies ○ — a fictional regional chain of 42 toy-and-hobby stores, 3,300 employees ◇ — for $600M ◇. Your fund wrote a check for $120M ◇ of its own money. The other $480M ◇ was borrowed — and the loan was placed on PlayMart's balance sheet, not yours. PlayMart now owes the money that was used to buy PlayMart.
Your job, for five years: maximize your fund's return multiple — every dollar the fund gets back, divided by the $120M it put in =. Each year you may borrow more against the company and pay it out to the fund, sell the stores' real estate to a fund affiliate and charge the company rent, bill the company management fees, cut its costs, or invest in it. Nothing on that menu is blocked. The lenders' only rules are printed below, and they apply to everyone equally.

The term sheet (all ◇ scenario assumptions, fixed for the whole game)

Interest: 8% a year on company debt while leverage (debt ÷ EBITDA) is 8× or less; 11% above 8×; 14% above 12×. The lenders reprice automatically — watch the projection line before you close the books.
Total company debt is capped at $1,000M by the credit agreement.
A dividend recap borrows money and pays it straight to the fund: debt up, fund up, company cash untouched.
A sale-leaseback pays the company cash for its buildings today; the company then pays rent of 8.5% of the sale price, every year, to the fund's affiliate. Sold stores also earn a little less from then on.
Investing grows the company's earnings and quality; cutting costs books cash now and erodes both.
The fund's investors (its LPs) watch what comes back to them. Send too little back for too long and Fund Patience runs out: the LPs force a sale of the fund's stake, cheap, whenever it hits zero.
At the end of Year 5 the fund sells its stake for whatever the company's equity is worth: earnings × a multiple that rises with company quality, minus the debt. If the company's cash goes negative at any year-end, it is bankrupt — and the fees it already paid stay paid.

Every figure in this game is a ◇ scenario assumption or = arithmetic on those assumptions, except the documented real-world case in the debrief (◆ sourced). PlayMart is ○ fictional. No real fund or company is depicted.

YEAR 1 OF 5FUND CASH RETURNED $0MMULTIPLE SO FAR 0.00×
LEDGER ONE — THE FUND

What the firm has taken out

Management fees$0M
Recap dividends$0M
Rent (via affiliate)$0M
Exit proceeds—
Total returned$0M

Against the fund's own $120M check ◇. Multiple = total ÷ 120.

LEDGER TWO — THE COMPANY

What PlayMart looks like

Cash$60M
Debt (the buyout loan + recaps)$480M
Real estate still owned$240M
Rent owed per year$0M
Last year's EBITDA—
Employees3,300

Store & staff quality: 70/100

FUND PATIENCE

The LPs' patience: 70/100. Distributions refill it; quiet years and heavy reinvestment drain it. At zero, the LPs force a cheap sale of the fund's stake.

1 · Dividend recapitalization

Borrow against PlayMart and pay the cash straight to the fund. Debt up, fund up; PlayMart's cash is untouched — but its interest bill grows.

2 · Sale-leaseback

Sell PlayMart's buildings to the fund's real-estate affiliate. PlayMart gets cash today and pays rent — 8.5% of the sale price, every year — from now on. Sold locations earn slightly less thereafter.

3 · Management fee

An annual fee from PlayMart to the fund for "monitoring and advice." Paid out of PlayMart's cash, into the fund's ledger.

4 · Operating posture

What the company itself does this year. This is the only lever that changes what PlayMart is worth.